The Train Wreck of October 1920
On a Thursday morning, in October 20th of 1920, eight persons, six of them women, were killed, and nineteen others injured when a car of the Cleveland-Buffalo express, eastbound, left the track and sideswiped the second Pullman car of the New York-Chicago express, westbound, of the New York Central railroad just west of the Union Depot, on the morning of the 20th.
As the New York Central train, No. 60, the eastbound express, was coasting into the station, the westbound express was pulling out. Suddenly one of the cars of the eastbound train was seen to leave the rail and crash into the side of the car in the westbound train. The heavy steel sides of the Pullman were torn away and the car thrown over on its side. Immediately, clouds of steam and dust arose and the passengers in the car were thrown into a heap as the car settled its open side pointing upward. As quickly as the dust settled, police and firemen, from their headquarters a block away, were using ladder in their efforts to extricate the dead and injured from the debris. Most of the dead were badly mutilated as were several of the more seriously injured. Ambulances from St. Vincent’s and Hamot hospitals were busy rushing the injured from the scene, while volunteers joined the police in removing the bodies of the dead. Engineer Hotchkiss and Fireman Batt of the eastbound train, both of whom escaped injury, declared at the scene that they had a clear signal as they approached the station.
Superintendent Wilson of the Cleveland division, whose private car was attached to the rear of the eastbound train, promptly took charge of caring for the dead and injured. Wilson announced, later that day, that an investigation into the accident would be held in the railroad’s division offices in Erie the following Friday morning. Officials of the interstate commerce commission arrived in Erie earlier on the day of the accident to open an investigation.
Coroner C.C. Cabot endeavored to identify the bodies of the dead, but practically every means of identification had been stripped from the bodies by looters, despite that immediately after the accident, police were called up to prevent looting of the car, as several persons were seen searching among the effects of the victims. Identification of the dead was also complicated by the fact that the passenger car lists were taken on when the westbound train proceeded to Cleveland.
The accident was caused by the failure of Switch Tender Bell to close the crossover switches as soon as the movement of engine 5941 through them had been completed, and by the action of Signal Maintainer Larson in cutting out the switch-protection relay, thus causing the automatic signals to display a false clear indication. It occurred at the crossovers, handled by a switch tender, whose shanty was located about 230 feet west of the west end of the station. The accident occurred at the west switch of the middle crossover, connecting tracks 1 and 2, about 700 feet west of the station.
About 220 feet west of the switch at which the accident occurred was a bracket post which carried two signal masts. On each mast was a two-arm, two-position, automatic block signal, that governed movements on track 2, known as signal 88-2. At a point 5,130 feet west of these signals was another bracket post carrying similar automatic signals, the signal governing movements on track 2 were known as signal 89-2. All of these signals normally displaying stop indications. Approaching from the west, the track was tangent for nearly 1 mile, followed by a 45-minute curve to the left 180 feet in length, 360 feet of tangent, and a 45-minute curve to the right 180 feet in length; the track was then tangent to the station, a distance of about 400 feet. The point of the switch at which the accident occurred is on the short tangent, 32 feet from its eastern end. The grade was descending for eastbound trains at the point of accident — the weather was clear that day.
The westbound passenger train No. 23 consisted of 1 steel-underframe baggage car, and 4 coaches, 1 dining car, and 4 Pullman sleeping cars, of all-steel construction, hauled by engine 4888, and was in the charge of Conductor Lilley and Engineman Brown. It left Buffalo at 8.14 a. m., 49 minutes late, arrived at Erie at 10.34 a. m., departed on track 1 at 10.38 a. m., 1 hour and 12 minutes late, and at about 10.39 a. m., while the train was moving at a speed estimated to have been 10 or 15 miles an hour, the seventh, eighth, and ninth cars in the train were struck by the engine of eastbound train No. 60.
The eastbound passenger train No. 60 consisted of 1 combination car, 3 coaches, 2 parlor cars, and 1 Pullman sleeping car, all of all-steel construction, and a private car, hauled by engine 4817, and was in the charge of Conductor Chapman and Engineman Hotchkiss. It left Cleveland at 8.30 a. m., on time, and while approaching the station at Erie on track 2, moving at a speed estimated to have been about 15 miles an hour, entered the west switch of the middle crossover and struck the side of train No. 23.
Engine 4817 first struck the rear of the seventh car in train No. 23, this car being slightly damaged. The side of the eighth car, the Pullman sleeping car Peosta, was torn out, as far as the center sills, from the head end to the rear truck, and the car thrown over on its right side across track 3; illustration No. 1 shows the condition of this car after it had been rerailed. After this car had been overturned engine 4817 struck the head end of the ninth car nearly head-on, driving it, together with the tenth car, backward a distance of about two passenger-car lengths. Engine 4817 came to rest with its head end about 300 feet east of the west switch of the middle crossover, with its right rear driving wheel and trailer derailed; its front end was considerably damaged on the left side.
Engineman Hotchkiss, of train No. 60, stated that clear indications were received at signals 89-2 and 88 2. As his train was not due to leave Erie until 10.42 a. m., and was arriving at about 10.40 a. m., he was not working steam, figuring on drifting into the station and leaving on time. Engineman Hotchkiss saw some men working on the switches, and thinking that the sound of train No. 23 on the adjoining track might prevent them from noticing the approach of his train; was about to sound the whistle as a warning when he saw them stand clear of the track. He had previously made a light application of the air brakes, and when he saw the front end of the engine head in at the open switch at the west end of the middle crossover he at once applied the air brakes in emergency, but he did not think the air brakes had had much opportunity to act before the accident occurred. He estimated the speed of his train to have been about 15 miles per hour. Immediately after the accident he went back to the switch and found it unlocked and lined for a crossover movement to track 1. The switch stand was on the fireman's side, and Engineman Hotchkiss said that he had not noticed its indication previous to the accident.
Fireman Batt was on his seat box looking ahead, but when train No. 23 approached he moved his head back inside of the cab window, and did not see anything further until he saw the engine enter the open switch. While looking forward with his head out of the window previous to the time train No. 23 approached, he had looked toward the station and had seen train No. 23 leaving and had noted that the tracks at the station were clear, not noticing the position of the switch points immediately ahead of his engine.
Engineman Gearhart, who was deadheading on train No. 60, was on the vestibule of the first car as the train approached Erie; and on looking ahead when about three city blocks from the point of accident noted that the automatic signals were displaying clear indications. He thought he felt an emergency application of the air brakes just before the shock of the collision. Division Engineer Upson, who was standing on the platform of the station, also noticed that signal 88-2 was displaying a clear indication, as did Crossing Watchman Pfeiffer, stationed at Sassafras Street, at the west end of the station.
None of the crew of westbound train No. 23 had any knowledge of the accident until they felt the emergency application of the air brakes, which was apparently a result of the accident. The estimates of the engineman, conductor, and flagman as to the speed was varied, from 12 to 15 miles an hour.
The interstate commerce commission’s investigation disclosed that engines 5941 and 4578, coupled, had arrived at Erie on track 3 from Weslevville, a distance of about 3 miles, at about 10.25 a. m., in the charge of Engineman Newman. Engineman Wagner took charge of engine 5941 and it was then moved through the three crossovers between tracks 3 and 4, Switch Tender Bell preceding the engine and opening the switches, but not closing them after the engine had passed through them. Engineman Newman, in the course of other duties, closed both switches of the east crossover and the east switch of the middle crossover. After engine 5941 had reached track 4, Switch Tender Bell closed the switch on that track and boarded the footboard on the head end of the engine for the purpose of riding eastward with it to the depot crossover. At this time; therefore, all of the various switches used in crossing over engine 5941 had been closed with the exception of the west switch of the middle crossover and the east switch of the west crossover, both switches being on track 2. Signal Maintainer Larson, with Assistant Signal Maintainer Carlson, was working at the east switch of the west crossover, while Signal Maintainer Truax was working at the west switch of the middle crossover, this work consisting of installing new switch boxes; the two switches at which these men were working are 19 feet apart.
According to statements given to investigators from the interstate commerce commission, Switch Tender Bell, when engine 5941 moved eastward on track 4 and had reached a point about opposite the two switches, which were still open, he signaled the engineman to stop; it being his intention to get off and close the switches, but he said Signal Maintainer Larson motioned to him to go ahead, at the same time saying, "I will get the switches," or words to that effect. Switch Tender Bell said he then replied. "All right," and after stepping on the footboard of the engine pointed at the other switch: this being the west switch of the middle, crossover, meaning that the signal maintainer was also to close that switch, and he said Signal Maintainer Larson nodded his head in the affirmative. As engine 5941 then proceeded eastward, Switch Tender Bell looked back and saw Signal Maintainer Larson throwing the east switch of the west crossover and supposed that he would also throw the remaining open switch, which was the west switch of the middle crossover, leading from eastbound track 2 to westbound track 1. After opening the switches for engine 5941 to move through the depot crossover into the yard, Switch Tender Bell crossed over to track 2, looked up the track and said that the switches apparently were all right, although he could not see them distinctly; he then returned to his shanty, remaining in that vicinity until the accident occurred. Switch Tender Bell admitted to investigators from the interstate commerce commission that it was his duty to close the switches, and that he had delegated a part of his duties to some one in no way responsible for their performance.
As engine 5941 was moving eastward on track 4 Fireman Hopp saw the signal maintainer give a signal and he thought that he was going to close both switches. Fireman Hopp thought this signal had been given to the switch tender, who was riding on the front footboard of his engine out of his line of vision. Engineman Wagner, being on the south side of his engine, was not in position to see any signals, which were passed between the two men.
Signal Maintainer Larson, along with his two assistants, were changing the switch box at the west switch of the middle cross over and preparing to change the switch box on the east switch of the west crossover. In changing these boxes it was necessary to disconnect all of the wires, and in order to avoid stopping trains at signal 88-2, with consequent delay to traffic, he bridged the wires on the switch-protection relay, this being at about 9 a. m. The effect of this action on the part of Signal Maintainer Larson was to cause the automatic signals to display clear indications to approaching trains regardless of the position of the switches — Regarding the bridging of the relay, the interstate commerce commission determined that the signal maintainer Larson was acting without specific authority. The switches were closed prior to the time engine 5941 made its crossover movement; after this movement had been completed and the engine had moved eastward on track 4, stopping about opposite him, Signal Maintainer Larson told Switch Tender Bell that he would close the switch, meaning the one at which be was actually working, the east switch of the west crossover. He then closed the switch and went on with his work, giving no thought to the fact that the west switch of the middle crossover was still open. Signal Maintainer Larson had no further conversation with the switch tender, he had said nothing to the switch tender to indicate that he would close both switches.
Assistant Signal Maintainer Carlson, who was working with Signal Maintainer Larson at the east switch of the west crossover, did not hear any conversation between Signal Maintainer Larson and Switch Tender Bell; some kind of signal was given by Signal Maintainer Larson, but he did not pay any attention to it and did not know what it was, neither did he pay any attention to the west switch of the middle crossover or know that it was open. Both Carlson and Signal Maintainer Larson noticed that the automatic signals were displaying clear indications as train No. 60 approached, but Carlson had been employed by the railroad only since July 7, and did not know anything about the circuits, or how the automatic signals could display a clear indication to an approaching train with a switch open.
Signal Maintainer Truax was working on the trunking at the west switch of the middle crossover; he did not hear any conversation between Signal Maintainer Larson and Switch Tender Bell relative to closing any of the switches, and did not notice any signals passed between them. When train No. 60 approached he saw that the automatic signal was displaying a clear indication, and while he knew that the circuit had been bridged, he was not familiar enough with the circuit to realize that the automatic signals could display a clear indication with the switch open. Truax did not know the switch was open, although he was working at the switch at the time Switch Tender Bell crossed over engine 5941 and had to get up from his work while this movement was being made; afterwards, he had forgotten about the position of the switch.
Signal Supervisor Dawson was at Erie, saw Signal Maintainer Larson immediately after the occurrence of the accident, and was told by him that he had bridged the circuit, which controlled the crossover. On examination Mr. Dawson found the conditions to be as stated, and immediately restored the wires to their original connections. He stated later to investigators from the interstate commerce commission that under the conditions, which existed at the time of the accident, the operation of the signals was what would be expected, after he had restored the circuits the signals operated as intended.
Switch Tender Bell admitted to investigators from the interstate commerce commission that he only closed one of the switches he had opened in the course of moving engine 5941 through the crossovers, and that he delegated to others duties, which he was supposed to perform. Signal Maintainer Larson admitted to investigators that he bridged the circuits with the result that a false clear indication was displayed for the movement of train No. 60, and that he had acted on his own authority in making such a change.
The question of who was to close the switches under the arrangement made between the two men does not appear to be one of veracity, but rather one of misunderstanding. Switch Tender Bell said Signal Maintainer Larson voluntarily motioned to him to go ahead and indicated that he would throw both switches, while Signal Maintainer Larson had reference only to the switch at which he himself was working, although the other switch, the opening of which resulted in this accident, was only 19 feet distant — although Fireman Hopp, of engine 5941, saw the signal maintainer give a signal, which he thought indicated that the signal maintainer would throw both switches.
While not directly responsible for this accident, Signal Maintainer Truax knew that the circuit had been bridged so that the switch-protection relay was cut out; he was working within 3 feet of the switch points of the open switch and saw the switch opened by Switch Tender Bell and knew that it had been left open; although when train No. 60 approached he forgot that this latter condition still existed. Although Truax did not know that the bridging of the circuit would permit the automatic signals to display clear indications to an approaching train, it is believed that when he stepped aside to allow train No. 60 to pass, it was reasonably a part of his duties to look at the switch at which he was working to make sure that no tools or other obstructions had been left on the rails and that the switch was properly lined for the movement of the approaching train. By his failure to take such action Signal Maintainer Truax contributed to the occurrence of this accident.
Switch Tender Bell was 20 years of age at the time of the accident. After about four months' service as a yard clerk he was employed as a switch tender in April of 1919; and in October of the same year was suspended for 10 days for failing to close a switch. Signal Maintainer Larson was employed as a battery man in 1907, and promoted to signal maintainer in 1911; he resigned in 1912, and was reemployed in 1916. Signal Maintainer Truax was employed as a helper in 1917, and on October 16, 1920, was transferred as signal maintainer to the section on which this accident occurred.
The engine crew of train No. 60 had been on duty about 4 hours, after about 13 hours off duty. The baggage-master of this train had been on duty about 2 1/2 hours, previous to which he had been off duty about 2 hours; previous to this 2-hour period off duty he had been on duty about 5 hours, after more than 24 hours off duty. The other trainmen on train No. 60 had been on duty about 2 1/2 hours, after more than 24 hours off duty. The engine crew of train No. 23 had been on duty nearly 5 hours, previous to which they had been off duty about 12 hours. The train crew had been on duty about 3 1/2 hours, previous to which they had been off duty more than 24 hours.
The Dead:
Mrs. Anna Tokle, 76, Grinnell, Ia., died at St. Vincent’s Hospital.
Miss Anna Tokle, 20, Grinnell, Ia., killed instantly.
Caspard Deschamps, Missoula, Mont., died at St. Vincent’s Hospital.
Algot Carlson, 13, Sebaska, Minn., died instantly.
Clara Miller, Chicago.
Mrs. J.P. Monaud, Los Angeles.
Ida Rosenthal, Chicago.
Unidentified Woman, about 30.
The Injured:
Alma Forsmack, 34, North Shipping, Sweden, fracture skull, may have died.
Unidentified Woman, unconscious, fractured skull.
Mrs. Laura Schmaldfeldt, 56, Davenport, Ia., fractured skull.
Mrs. Jack Hanson, 32, Seattle, lacerations of face and shoulders.
Leroy Hanson, 9, Seattle, cuts and lacerations.
Mrs. S.L. Secord, 31, Chicago, two broken ribs and lacerations of face and hands.
Walter W. Richardson, 27, New York, body contusions.
George W. Andrews, Buffalo, shock and cuts.
Mrs. Ida C. Meyers, 5, Chicago, bruised shoulder and shock.
Mrs. Findlat Wood, Pallatine, Ill., bruises and shock.
Mrs. C.C. Flagg, 36, Indiana Harbor, cut, lacerated scalp.
A.H. Breler, 58, Waterbury, Conn., lacerations of face, contusion, shock.
William Challicon, 67, South Bend, Ind., bruises.
Paul [illegible], 53, Wyoming, Pa., bruises.
Christina Carlson, Sebaska, Minn., lacerations.
Emmett Carlson, 7, Sebaska, Minn., bruises.
Chester Carlson, 10, Sebaska, Minn., bruises.
Gideon Carlson, 10, leg broken.
Bert Tokle, 40, Grinnell, Ia., lacerations of face.
As the New York Central train, No. 60, the eastbound express, was coasting into the station, the westbound express was pulling out. Suddenly one of the cars of the eastbound train was seen to leave the rail and crash into the side of the car in the westbound train. The heavy steel sides of the Pullman were torn away and the car thrown over on its side. Immediately, clouds of steam and dust arose and the passengers in the car were thrown into a heap as the car settled its open side pointing upward. As quickly as the dust settled, police and firemen, from their headquarters a block away, were using ladder in their efforts to extricate the dead and injured from the debris. Most of the dead were badly mutilated as were several of the more seriously injured. Ambulances from St. Vincent’s and Hamot hospitals were busy rushing the injured from the scene, while volunteers joined the police in removing the bodies of the dead. Engineer Hotchkiss and Fireman Batt of the eastbound train, both of whom escaped injury, declared at the scene that they had a clear signal as they approached the station.
Superintendent Wilson of the Cleveland division, whose private car was attached to the rear of the eastbound train, promptly took charge of caring for the dead and injured. Wilson announced, later that day, that an investigation into the accident would be held in the railroad’s division offices in Erie the following Friday morning. Officials of the interstate commerce commission arrived in Erie earlier on the day of the accident to open an investigation.
Coroner C.C. Cabot endeavored to identify the bodies of the dead, but practically every means of identification had been stripped from the bodies by looters, despite that immediately after the accident, police were called up to prevent looting of the car, as several persons were seen searching among the effects of the victims. Identification of the dead was also complicated by the fact that the passenger car lists were taken on when the westbound train proceeded to Cleveland.
The accident was caused by the failure of Switch Tender Bell to close the crossover switches as soon as the movement of engine 5941 through them had been completed, and by the action of Signal Maintainer Larson in cutting out the switch-protection relay, thus causing the automatic signals to display a false clear indication. It occurred at the crossovers, handled by a switch tender, whose shanty was located about 230 feet west of the west end of the station. The accident occurred at the west switch of the middle crossover, connecting tracks 1 and 2, about 700 feet west of the station.
About 220 feet west of the switch at which the accident occurred was a bracket post which carried two signal masts. On each mast was a two-arm, two-position, automatic block signal, that governed movements on track 2, known as signal 88-2. At a point 5,130 feet west of these signals was another bracket post carrying similar automatic signals, the signal governing movements on track 2 were known as signal 89-2. All of these signals normally displaying stop indications. Approaching from the west, the track was tangent for nearly 1 mile, followed by a 45-minute curve to the left 180 feet in length, 360 feet of tangent, and a 45-minute curve to the right 180 feet in length; the track was then tangent to the station, a distance of about 400 feet. The point of the switch at which the accident occurred is on the short tangent, 32 feet from its eastern end. The grade was descending for eastbound trains at the point of accident — the weather was clear that day.
The westbound passenger train No. 23 consisted of 1 steel-underframe baggage car, and 4 coaches, 1 dining car, and 4 Pullman sleeping cars, of all-steel construction, hauled by engine 4888, and was in the charge of Conductor Lilley and Engineman Brown. It left Buffalo at 8.14 a. m., 49 minutes late, arrived at Erie at 10.34 a. m., departed on track 1 at 10.38 a. m., 1 hour and 12 minutes late, and at about 10.39 a. m., while the train was moving at a speed estimated to have been 10 or 15 miles an hour, the seventh, eighth, and ninth cars in the train were struck by the engine of eastbound train No. 60.
The eastbound passenger train No. 60 consisted of 1 combination car, 3 coaches, 2 parlor cars, and 1 Pullman sleeping car, all of all-steel construction, and a private car, hauled by engine 4817, and was in the charge of Conductor Chapman and Engineman Hotchkiss. It left Cleveland at 8.30 a. m., on time, and while approaching the station at Erie on track 2, moving at a speed estimated to have been about 15 miles an hour, entered the west switch of the middle crossover and struck the side of train No. 23.
Engine 4817 first struck the rear of the seventh car in train No. 23, this car being slightly damaged. The side of the eighth car, the Pullman sleeping car Peosta, was torn out, as far as the center sills, from the head end to the rear truck, and the car thrown over on its right side across track 3; illustration No. 1 shows the condition of this car after it had been rerailed. After this car had been overturned engine 4817 struck the head end of the ninth car nearly head-on, driving it, together with the tenth car, backward a distance of about two passenger-car lengths. Engine 4817 came to rest with its head end about 300 feet east of the west switch of the middle crossover, with its right rear driving wheel and trailer derailed; its front end was considerably damaged on the left side.
Engineman Hotchkiss, of train No. 60, stated that clear indications were received at signals 89-2 and 88 2. As his train was not due to leave Erie until 10.42 a. m., and was arriving at about 10.40 a. m., he was not working steam, figuring on drifting into the station and leaving on time. Engineman Hotchkiss saw some men working on the switches, and thinking that the sound of train No. 23 on the adjoining track might prevent them from noticing the approach of his train; was about to sound the whistle as a warning when he saw them stand clear of the track. He had previously made a light application of the air brakes, and when he saw the front end of the engine head in at the open switch at the west end of the middle crossover he at once applied the air brakes in emergency, but he did not think the air brakes had had much opportunity to act before the accident occurred. He estimated the speed of his train to have been about 15 miles per hour. Immediately after the accident he went back to the switch and found it unlocked and lined for a crossover movement to track 1. The switch stand was on the fireman's side, and Engineman Hotchkiss said that he had not noticed its indication previous to the accident.
Fireman Batt was on his seat box looking ahead, but when train No. 23 approached he moved his head back inside of the cab window, and did not see anything further until he saw the engine enter the open switch. While looking forward with his head out of the window previous to the time train No. 23 approached, he had looked toward the station and had seen train No. 23 leaving and had noted that the tracks at the station were clear, not noticing the position of the switch points immediately ahead of his engine.
Engineman Gearhart, who was deadheading on train No. 60, was on the vestibule of the first car as the train approached Erie; and on looking ahead when about three city blocks from the point of accident noted that the automatic signals were displaying clear indications. He thought he felt an emergency application of the air brakes just before the shock of the collision. Division Engineer Upson, who was standing on the platform of the station, also noticed that signal 88-2 was displaying a clear indication, as did Crossing Watchman Pfeiffer, stationed at Sassafras Street, at the west end of the station.
None of the crew of westbound train No. 23 had any knowledge of the accident until they felt the emergency application of the air brakes, which was apparently a result of the accident. The estimates of the engineman, conductor, and flagman as to the speed was varied, from 12 to 15 miles an hour.
The interstate commerce commission’s investigation disclosed that engines 5941 and 4578, coupled, had arrived at Erie on track 3 from Weslevville, a distance of about 3 miles, at about 10.25 a. m., in the charge of Engineman Newman. Engineman Wagner took charge of engine 5941 and it was then moved through the three crossovers between tracks 3 and 4, Switch Tender Bell preceding the engine and opening the switches, but not closing them after the engine had passed through them. Engineman Newman, in the course of other duties, closed both switches of the east crossover and the east switch of the middle crossover. After engine 5941 had reached track 4, Switch Tender Bell closed the switch on that track and boarded the footboard on the head end of the engine for the purpose of riding eastward with it to the depot crossover. At this time; therefore, all of the various switches used in crossing over engine 5941 had been closed with the exception of the west switch of the middle crossover and the east switch of the west crossover, both switches being on track 2. Signal Maintainer Larson, with Assistant Signal Maintainer Carlson, was working at the east switch of the west crossover, while Signal Maintainer Truax was working at the west switch of the middle crossover, this work consisting of installing new switch boxes; the two switches at which these men were working are 19 feet apart.
According to statements given to investigators from the interstate commerce commission, Switch Tender Bell, when engine 5941 moved eastward on track 4 and had reached a point about opposite the two switches, which were still open, he signaled the engineman to stop; it being his intention to get off and close the switches, but he said Signal Maintainer Larson motioned to him to go ahead, at the same time saying, "I will get the switches," or words to that effect. Switch Tender Bell said he then replied. "All right," and after stepping on the footboard of the engine pointed at the other switch: this being the west switch of the middle, crossover, meaning that the signal maintainer was also to close that switch, and he said Signal Maintainer Larson nodded his head in the affirmative. As engine 5941 then proceeded eastward, Switch Tender Bell looked back and saw Signal Maintainer Larson throwing the east switch of the west crossover and supposed that he would also throw the remaining open switch, which was the west switch of the middle crossover, leading from eastbound track 2 to westbound track 1. After opening the switches for engine 5941 to move through the depot crossover into the yard, Switch Tender Bell crossed over to track 2, looked up the track and said that the switches apparently were all right, although he could not see them distinctly; he then returned to his shanty, remaining in that vicinity until the accident occurred. Switch Tender Bell admitted to investigators from the interstate commerce commission that it was his duty to close the switches, and that he had delegated a part of his duties to some one in no way responsible for their performance.
As engine 5941 was moving eastward on track 4 Fireman Hopp saw the signal maintainer give a signal and he thought that he was going to close both switches. Fireman Hopp thought this signal had been given to the switch tender, who was riding on the front footboard of his engine out of his line of vision. Engineman Wagner, being on the south side of his engine, was not in position to see any signals, which were passed between the two men.
Signal Maintainer Larson, along with his two assistants, were changing the switch box at the west switch of the middle cross over and preparing to change the switch box on the east switch of the west crossover. In changing these boxes it was necessary to disconnect all of the wires, and in order to avoid stopping trains at signal 88-2, with consequent delay to traffic, he bridged the wires on the switch-protection relay, this being at about 9 a. m. The effect of this action on the part of Signal Maintainer Larson was to cause the automatic signals to display clear indications to approaching trains regardless of the position of the switches — Regarding the bridging of the relay, the interstate commerce commission determined that the signal maintainer Larson was acting without specific authority. The switches were closed prior to the time engine 5941 made its crossover movement; after this movement had been completed and the engine had moved eastward on track 4, stopping about opposite him, Signal Maintainer Larson told Switch Tender Bell that he would close the switch, meaning the one at which be was actually working, the east switch of the west crossover. He then closed the switch and went on with his work, giving no thought to the fact that the west switch of the middle crossover was still open. Signal Maintainer Larson had no further conversation with the switch tender, he had said nothing to the switch tender to indicate that he would close both switches.
Assistant Signal Maintainer Carlson, who was working with Signal Maintainer Larson at the east switch of the west crossover, did not hear any conversation between Signal Maintainer Larson and Switch Tender Bell; some kind of signal was given by Signal Maintainer Larson, but he did not pay any attention to it and did not know what it was, neither did he pay any attention to the west switch of the middle crossover or know that it was open. Both Carlson and Signal Maintainer Larson noticed that the automatic signals were displaying clear indications as train No. 60 approached, but Carlson had been employed by the railroad only since July 7, and did not know anything about the circuits, or how the automatic signals could display a clear indication to an approaching train with a switch open.
Signal Maintainer Truax was working on the trunking at the west switch of the middle crossover; he did not hear any conversation between Signal Maintainer Larson and Switch Tender Bell relative to closing any of the switches, and did not notice any signals passed between them. When train No. 60 approached he saw that the automatic signal was displaying a clear indication, and while he knew that the circuit had been bridged, he was not familiar enough with the circuit to realize that the automatic signals could display a clear indication with the switch open. Truax did not know the switch was open, although he was working at the switch at the time Switch Tender Bell crossed over engine 5941 and had to get up from his work while this movement was being made; afterwards, he had forgotten about the position of the switch.
Signal Supervisor Dawson was at Erie, saw Signal Maintainer Larson immediately after the occurrence of the accident, and was told by him that he had bridged the circuit, which controlled the crossover. On examination Mr. Dawson found the conditions to be as stated, and immediately restored the wires to their original connections. He stated later to investigators from the interstate commerce commission that under the conditions, which existed at the time of the accident, the operation of the signals was what would be expected, after he had restored the circuits the signals operated as intended.
Switch Tender Bell admitted to investigators from the interstate commerce commission that he only closed one of the switches he had opened in the course of moving engine 5941 through the crossovers, and that he delegated to others duties, which he was supposed to perform. Signal Maintainer Larson admitted to investigators that he bridged the circuits with the result that a false clear indication was displayed for the movement of train No. 60, and that he had acted on his own authority in making such a change.
The question of who was to close the switches under the arrangement made between the two men does not appear to be one of veracity, but rather one of misunderstanding. Switch Tender Bell said Signal Maintainer Larson voluntarily motioned to him to go ahead and indicated that he would throw both switches, while Signal Maintainer Larson had reference only to the switch at which he himself was working, although the other switch, the opening of which resulted in this accident, was only 19 feet distant — although Fireman Hopp, of engine 5941, saw the signal maintainer give a signal, which he thought indicated that the signal maintainer would throw both switches.
While not directly responsible for this accident, Signal Maintainer Truax knew that the circuit had been bridged so that the switch-protection relay was cut out; he was working within 3 feet of the switch points of the open switch and saw the switch opened by Switch Tender Bell and knew that it had been left open; although when train No. 60 approached he forgot that this latter condition still existed. Although Truax did not know that the bridging of the circuit would permit the automatic signals to display clear indications to an approaching train, it is believed that when he stepped aside to allow train No. 60 to pass, it was reasonably a part of his duties to look at the switch at which he was working to make sure that no tools or other obstructions had been left on the rails and that the switch was properly lined for the movement of the approaching train. By his failure to take such action Signal Maintainer Truax contributed to the occurrence of this accident.
Switch Tender Bell was 20 years of age at the time of the accident. After about four months' service as a yard clerk he was employed as a switch tender in April of 1919; and in October of the same year was suspended for 10 days for failing to close a switch. Signal Maintainer Larson was employed as a battery man in 1907, and promoted to signal maintainer in 1911; he resigned in 1912, and was reemployed in 1916. Signal Maintainer Truax was employed as a helper in 1917, and on October 16, 1920, was transferred as signal maintainer to the section on which this accident occurred.
The engine crew of train No. 60 had been on duty about 4 hours, after about 13 hours off duty. The baggage-master of this train had been on duty about 2 1/2 hours, previous to which he had been off duty about 2 hours; previous to this 2-hour period off duty he had been on duty about 5 hours, after more than 24 hours off duty. The other trainmen on train No. 60 had been on duty about 2 1/2 hours, after more than 24 hours off duty. The engine crew of train No. 23 had been on duty nearly 5 hours, previous to which they had been off duty about 12 hours. The train crew had been on duty about 3 1/2 hours, previous to which they had been off duty more than 24 hours.
The Dead:
Mrs. Anna Tokle, 76, Grinnell, Ia., died at St. Vincent’s Hospital.
Miss Anna Tokle, 20, Grinnell, Ia., killed instantly.
Caspard Deschamps, Missoula, Mont., died at St. Vincent’s Hospital.
Algot Carlson, 13, Sebaska, Minn., died instantly.
Clara Miller, Chicago.
Mrs. J.P. Monaud, Los Angeles.
Ida Rosenthal, Chicago.
Unidentified Woman, about 30.
The Injured:
Alma Forsmack, 34, North Shipping, Sweden, fracture skull, may have died.
Unidentified Woman, unconscious, fractured skull.
Mrs. Laura Schmaldfeldt, 56, Davenport, Ia., fractured skull.
Mrs. Jack Hanson, 32, Seattle, lacerations of face and shoulders.
Leroy Hanson, 9, Seattle, cuts and lacerations.
Mrs. S.L. Secord, 31, Chicago, two broken ribs and lacerations of face and hands.
Walter W. Richardson, 27, New York, body contusions.
George W. Andrews, Buffalo, shock and cuts.
Mrs. Ida C. Meyers, 5, Chicago, bruised shoulder and shock.
Mrs. Findlat Wood, Pallatine, Ill., bruises and shock.
Mrs. C.C. Flagg, 36, Indiana Harbor, cut, lacerated scalp.
A.H. Breler, 58, Waterbury, Conn., lacerations of face, contusion, shock.
William Challicon, 67, South Bend, Ind., bruises.
Paul [illegible], 53, Wyoming, Pa., bruises.
Christina Carlson, Sebaska, Minn., lacerations.
Emmett Carlson, 7, Sebaska, Minn., bruises.
Chester Carlson, 10, Sebaska, Minn., bruises.
Gideon Carlson, 10, leg broken.
Bert Tokle, 40, Grinnell, Ia., lacerations of face.